[1] al-Manṭiq. 1. al-Madkhal. 2. al-Maqūlāt. 3. al-ʻIbārah. 4. al-Qiyās. 5. al-Burhān. 6. al-Jadal. 7. al-Safsaṭah. 8. al-Khaṭābah. 9. al-Shiʻr (4 v.) -- [2] al-Ṭabīʻīyat. 2. al-Samāʼ wa-al-ʻālam. 3. al-Kawn wa-al-fasād. 4. al-Afʻāl wa-al-infiʻālāt. 5. al-Maʻādin wa-al-āthār al-ʻulwīyah. 6. al-Nafs. 7. al-Nabāt -- [3] al-Riyāḍīyāt. [1] Uṣūl al-handasah. 2. al-Ḥisāb. 3. Jawāmiʻ ʻilm al-mūsīqá. [4] al-Ilāhīyāt.

Caliphate; Māwardī, ʻAlī ibn Muḥammad, 974?-1058; political and social views.

Quʹest-ce que lʹêre? Cette question passe pour fonder la philosophie. Encore faut-il s'entendre sur le sens du mot "être ". L'essence des choses détermine-t-elle leur existence? Devons-nous affirmer, au contraire, que l'existence conditionne l'intensité d'être qui qualifie une certaine réalité? Molla Sadr Shirazi, dans ce traité écrit en Iran au siècle de Descartes et de Leibniz, médite ces questions qui sont encore les nôtres. Mais les solutions qu'il propose s'évadent hors de nos perspectives, après avoir opéré une révolution décisive dans (...) la métaphysique des Orientaux. Penseur shi'ite en butte à la persécution, Molla Sadra est la plus haute figure de la philosophie iranienne islamique au temps splendide de la cour safavide d'Ispahan. Sa doctrine du primat de l'existence, que le présent ouvrage expose complètement, ouvre sur une interprétation spirituelle de la résurrection des corps. Cette traduction par Henry Corbin, qui fut aussi l'éditeur du texte original, a fait événement : par son ample introduction, il situe la question de l'être et déploie une explication comparée de ce que l'Occident grec puis médiéval en ont fait, avec la tradition shi'iite. -- Back cover. (shrink)

Hasta el momento, la obra más conocida e importante del prolífico autor andalusí Ibn Saʿīd al-Maġribī (m. 685/1286) era su antología al-Muġrib fī ḥulà l-Maġrib (Lo extraordinario acerca de las joyas del Occidente). Sin embargo, igual en importancia debió de ser su homóloga oriental, al-Mušriq fī ḥulà l-Mašriq (Lo extraordinario acerca de las joyas del Oriente), obra de la que, por el contrario, se conoce muy poco. El propósito de este artículo es dar a conocer esta obra de Ibn Saʿīd, (...) dedicada a Oriente, así como el estudio preliminar de dos manuscritos inéditos del Mušriq, preservados en El Cairo. En él se tratan aspectos relativos a la composición de la obra, su autoría, su estructura y fuentes, y se ofrece una breve descripción de las principales características de ambos manuscritos junto con la información más relevante que contienen. (shrink)

RésuméDepuis Ibn Mattawayh et Mānkdīm jusqu'à George Hourani et Marie Bernand, les spécialistes ont montré un intérêt constant pour la théorie de la connaissance d' ʿAbd al-Jabbār, intérêt plus grand encore depuis la parution des textes de Muʿtazilites tardifs comme leKitāb al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Dīnd'Ibn al-Malāḥimī, et leKitāb Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillade son maître Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Cet article examine la théorie de la connaissance immédiate d' ʿAbd al-Jabbār à partir de sonMughnī, ainsi que de textes écrits par ses élèves ou par (...) des Muʿtazilites tardifs. Est aussi étudié le rapport entre cette théorie et les arguments théologiques d'ʿAbd al-Jabbār. Ce travail est divisé en deux parties: en premier lieu, j'étudie la définition de la connaissance immédiate par ʿAbd al-Jabbār et les réactions de ses successeurs; en second lieu, j'analyse sa conception des types de connaissance immédiate étroitement liés à ses arguments théologiques. Et à partir de là, je montre comment le désaccord à propos du contenu de cette connaissance est à l'origine du débat opposant les théologiens musulmans (mutakallimūn) à propos de la validité de certains arguments théologiques. (shrink)

Fəlsəfə tarixinə nəzər yetirdiyimiz zaman insanın mental hallarının əsasən ruh/nəfs fikri ilə izah edildiyinin şahidi oluruq. Nəfsin mahiyyəti məsələsi isə qədim yunan filosoflarından bəri müzakirə olunmuş və bu barədə fərqli nəzəriyyələr ortaya qoyulmuşdur. Qədim yunan filosoflarından Platon nəfsin maddi bədəndən təmamilə fərqli, qeyri-maddi bir substansiyadan təşkil olunduğunu düşünür və onun bədəndən müstəqil var ola bilən, əzəli və əbədi olduğunu iddia edirdi. Substansial dualizm olaraq tanınan bu nəzəriyyəni qəbul etməyən Aristotel isə nəfsi bədənin mükəmməlliyi kimi tərif edir və Platondan fərqli olaraq (...) onun bədəndən öncə var olması fikrini, eləcə də, ölümsüzlüyünü inkar edirdi. İslam filosofları Aristotelin nəfs tərifini qəbul etsələr də onu Platon kimi qeyri-maddi substansiya hesab edir və insanın maddi bədən və qeyri-maddi nəfsdən təşkil olunduğunu deyirdilər. Səfəvilər dövrünün İslam filosofu Sədrəddin Şirazi isə sələflərindən bir çox cəhətdən fərqlənən nəfs konsepsiyası ilə çıxış edir. O da İbn Sina və digər müsəlman filosoflar kimi nəfsin “orqanları olan təbii bir cismin ilk mükəmməlliyi (ἐντελέχια)” olmasına dair aristotelist tərifi qəbul edir, ancaq onun fikrincə tərifdəki orqanlar maddi bədən üzvləri olmayıb, nəfsin gücləridir. Platondan fərqli olaraq Şirazi nəfsin əzəli olmayıb yarandığını qəbul edir. Lakin nəfsin bədənlə birlikdə yarandığını düşünən İbn Sinadan fərqli olaraq Şirazi nəfsin yarandığı zaman mücərrəd varlıq olması fikrini rədd edir. Ona görə nəfs maddi bədəndə ortaya çıxır. Maddi yaransa da Şiraziyə görə nəfs təbiətən sahib olduğu substansial hərəkət sayəsində zamanla dəyişərək ruhani varlığa çevrilərək ölümsüzlük əldə edir. Bu məqalə Sədrəddin Şirazinin nəfs konsepsiyasını ələ alaraq onun nəfs və ruh anlayşını, nəfsin tərifi, yaranması və bədənlə münasibtinə dair fikirlərini təhlil edir. (shrink)

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

al-Mujallad al-awwal. Muqaddimāt al-taḥqīq wa-muqaddimat al-Imām al-Zubaydī lil-Itḥāf -- al-mujallad al-thānī. Kitāb al-ʻIlm ilá nihāyat al-bāb al-thālith -- al-mujallad al-thālith. Tatimmat kitāb al-ʻilm min al-bāb al-rābiʻ ilá ākhir al-kitāb -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ. Kitāb Qawāʻid al-ʻaqāʼid -- al-mujallad al-khāmis. Kitāb Asrār al-ṭahārah -- al-mujallad al-sādis. Kitāb Asrār al-ṣalāh ilá nihāyat shurūṭ al-jumʻah min al-bāb al-khāmis -- al-mujallad al-sābiʻ. Tatimmat kitāb asrār al-ṣalāh min ādāb al-jumʻah ilá ākhir al-kitāb -- al-mujallad al-thāmin. Kitābā Asrār al-zakāh wa-asrār al-ṣawm -- al-mujallad al- tāsiʻ. Kitāb asrār (...) al-ḥajj -- al-mujallad al-ʻāshir. Kitābā ādāb tilāwat al-Qurʼān wa-al-adhkār wa-al-daʻawāt -- al-mujallad al-ḥādī ʻashar. Kitābā tartīb al-awrād wa-tafḍīl iḥyāʼ al-layl wa-ādāb al-akl -- al-mujalladal-thānī ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-Nikāḥ wa-ādāb al-Kasb wa-al-maʻāsh -- al-mujallad al-thālith ʻashar. Kitāb al-Ḥalāl wa-al-ḥarām -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ ʻashar. Kitāb al-Ulfah wa-al-ukhuwwah -- al-mujallad al-khāmis ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-ʻUzlah wa-ādāb al-Safar -- al-mujallad al-sādis ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-Samāʻ wa-al-wajd wa-al-Amr bi-al-maʻrūf wa-al-nahy ʻan al-munkar -- al-mujallad al-sābiʻ ʻashar. Kitābā ādāb al-maʻīshah wa-akhlāq al-nubūwah wa-sharḥ ʻajāʼib al-qalb -- al-mujallad al-thāmin ʻashar. Kitābā riyāḍat al-nafs wa-tahdhīb al-akhlāq wa-kasr al-shahwatayn -- al-mujallad al-tāsiʻ ʻashar. Kitābā āfāt al-lisān wa-dhamm al-ghaḍab -- al-mujallad al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā dhamm al-dunyā wa-dhamm al-bukhl -- al-mujallad al-ḥādī wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā dhamm al-jāh wa-dhamm al-kibr wa-al-ʻajab -- al-mujallad al-thānī wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā dhamm al-ghurūr wa-al-tawbah -- al-mujallad al-thālith wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā al-ṣabr wa-al-shukr -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitābā al-rajā wa-al-khawf -- al-mujallad al-khāmis wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb al-zuhd wa-al-faqr -- al-mujallad al-sādis wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb al-tawḥīd wa al-tawakkul -- al-mujallad al-sābiʻ wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb al-maḥabbah wa-al-shawq wa-al-uns wa-al-riḍā -- al-mujallad al-thāmin wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kutub al-ikhlāṣ wa-al-nīyah wa-al-murāqabah wa-al-muḥāsabah wa-al-tafakkur -- al-mujallad al- tāsiʻ wa-al-ʻishrūn. Kitāb dhikr al-mawt wa-mā baʻdih ilá nihāyat al-bāb al-thāmin -- al-mujallad al-thalāthūn. Kitāb dhikr al-mawt wa-mā baʻdih ilá ākhar al-kitāb wa-yalīhi maṣādir al-taḥqīq. (shrink)

The book under study is "Kitāb al-Uṣūl" and its commentary "Sharḥ al-Uṣūl" written by Ibn Ḥallād al-Basrī, one of Abū Ḥāshim al-Jubbāʾī's leading students. This work is the result of the Mu'tazilite Manuscripts Project conducted by Sabine Schmidtke and D. E. Sklare, and has been published in an edited edition by Camilla Adang, Wilferd Madelung, and Sabine Schmidtke. The study, entitled "-A Critical Edition of the Ziyādāt Sharḥ al-uṣūl by the Zaydī Imām al-Nāṭiq bi-l-ḥaqq Abū Ṭālib Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn b. (...) Hārūn al-Buṭḥānī " begins with quotations from Ibn Ḥallād's Kitāb al-uṣūl or its incomplete commentary, Sharḥ al-uṣūl. This is followed by various quotations written in addition to Ibn Ḥallād's incomplete commentary, which are mostly from Kādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār's Sharḥ. Then the commentary of the Zaydī Imam Nāṭīq-Bilḥāq is added, and finally, the text is completed by the commentary of his student and annotator, Abū al-Ḳāsīm Aḥmad b. Mahdī al-Ḥasan. Although the text does not directly define the usūl al-hamsa, the reader can recognize this progression. Beginning with tawhid, the text moves on to justice, followed by va'd-va'id, and finally concludes with topics such as predestination, sustenance, accident, and fate. (shrink)

The passionate and staunch defence of logic of the controversial thinker Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd of Córdoba (384-456/994-1064), had lasting consequences in the Islamic world. Indeed, his book Facilitating the Understanding of the Rules of Logic and Introduction Thereto, with Common Expressions and Juristic Examples (Kitāb al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq wa-l-mudkhal ilayhi bi-l-alfāẓ al-ʿāmmiyya wa-l-amthila al-fiqhiyya), composed in 1025-1029, was well known and discussed during and after his time; and it paved the way for the studies (...) of his compatriots Ibn Bājjah (d. 1138), Ibn Ṭufayl (1185), and Ibn Rushd (1198), who each gave demonstrative reasoning a privileged place within the methods of attaining knowledge. Unfortunately, as too often in the history of science, Ibn Ḥazm’s innovative perspectives and contributions in logic have been overlooked or considered with an attitude of contempt. On the one hand, his work has been seen, at best, as promulgating the benefits of studying Aristotle’s logic, so that his contribution is assessed as more didactical than conceptual. And on the other hand, those who do examine his innovations often consider them to be mistaken. As indicated by Chejne (1984, p. 2) contempt towards the logical work of Ibn Ḥazm was also present in its reception by the Eastern philosophers who accused him of deviating from Aristotelian logic and of dabbling in things beyond his capability. However, a reassessment of his work on logic has since begun, by delving into the ways the thinker of Córdoba studied the links between deontic and modal qualification of propositions. In this context Lameer’s (2013) paper on the logical sources of Ibn Ḥazm is worth mentioning; the author (p. 417, footnote 1) observes that, although, strictly speaking, it was al-Fārābī who first drew the parallelism between deontic and modal concepts, it was Ibn Ḥazm who developed it and worked it out in a more precise manner. A primary aim of this paper is to help fill some of these gaps by stressing the role of the work of Ibn Ḥazm in developing a notion of deontic necessity deeply rooted in legal normativity, and in explicitly discussing the transference between deontic and modal concepts. According to our view; the basic units of Islamic deontic logic are what we might call, indulging in terminological anachronism, heteronomous imperatives. As it turns out, the heteronomy of imperatives within Islamic legal systems contrasts with those of the purely moral realm, which seem to be closer to an autonomous conception of moral law. There it concurs again with Leibniz’s proposal to define obligatory as “what is necessary for a good person to do”. In the present paper, we will focus on the heteronomous imperatives of legal systems rather than on the imperatives of the purely moral realm. In this context, the work of Ibn Ḥazm extends the parallelism between the necessity of events and that of human actions stressed by his predecessors. According to our understanding, Ibn Ḥazm’s parallelism can be rendered explicit formally by means of a conditional (or hypothetical) structure shared by both deontic and modal propositions. Moreover, this structure makes apparent that this parallelism displays an underlying system of “degrees”. Indeed, while in the domain of events, given some conditions, it makes sense to distinguish between an event that is more likely to happen than another. Ibn Ḥazm speaks of near and distant possibility (such as the higher degree of likelihood of rain, given the condensation of clouds in December, and its lower degree, when the condensation occurs in summer); and, in the domain of actions, the Islamic notion of weighting actions determines degrees of virtue (or of legal and moral value). So whereas the degree of virtue of performing a forbidden act as determined by the distribution of sanction and reward is 0, we obtain the same value by pondering the likelihood of an impossible event to take place. Furthermore, as discussed in section II.3.2, the system of values at work in the parallelism can be seen as opening the way to a more direct correspondence. Thus, while in the realm of nature, likelihood of occurrence of an event is dependent upon the conditions specific to the occurrence of that event; while, in the realm of jurisprudence, likelihood of performing an action is dependent upon the distribution of reward and sanction specific to that action (being that, given the choice to perform or not perform a given action, those that will be rewarded are more likely to be performed than those that are not). According to this perspective, the point of the parallelism is that both deontic and modal qualifications measure the degree of an action or event to become actual; that is – indulging once more in anachronism (but this time from the Leibnizian background) – the degree measures how feasible (facile) an action or event may be. This suggests that Ibn Ḥazm’s perspectives already herald the links to probability and possibility explored by Leibniz six centuries later – see for example Leibniz’s (1671, A VI, I, p. 424-26) use of probability in the context of conditional right. Nevertheless, it also shows a crucial difference to the approach developed in the Elementa Jura Naturalis: whereas Leibniz’s studies seek to define what is to be just or virtuous, the logical system of deontic imperatives within Islamic jurisprudence presupposes that what is to be virtuous has already been settled. Determining what is to be virtuous is not achieved by logical reasoning within the system of legal jurisprudence, but by delving into the higher objectives of the Sharīʿa. While developing our point, we will delve into the logical structure of the heteronomous imperatives. This distinguishes our contribution from the existing literature, such as the papers of Chejne (1984), Lameer (2014), and Guerrero (1997, 2010, 2014), which do not provide a logical analysis of the deontic concepts put into work by Ibn Ḥazm. The true antecedent to the present paper is the work of Farid Zidani (2007, 2015), who, so far as we know, was the first to undertake such a task. Some of our own developments and general epistemological thoughts go beyond Ibn Ḥazm’s framework and motivations; mainly those contained in sections II.3.2 and IV. However, according to our view, these reflections suggest that Ibn Ḥazm’s approach has the substance for a broader and deeper exploration of the logic of norms. The paper is structured as follows:I.Ibn Ḥazm’s Logic of Heteronomous Imperatives. After presenting some extracts of the relevant text, we proceed by providing a formal reconstruction of the five forms of deontic modalities. II. A Landmark in the History of the Logical Analysis of Norms. Duties and Modalities. In this section, we study the transferences from deontic to modal necessity and possibility. We briefly compare the deontic system of Islamic Jurisprudence with that of Leibniz.III. Leibniz and Hypothetical Imperatives in Law.IV. Beyond Ibn Ḥazm: Conclusions and the Work Ahead. We will conclude the paper by discussing briefly some conceptual points that distinguish the logic of heteronomous imperatives from contemporary deontic logic. Our final words will discuss deontic-modal parallelism in the context of Ibn Ḥazm’s rejection of reasoning by conjecture and what we call “the internalization of nature.”. (shrink)

The central issue in this work is self-knowledge. The human soul is created in the Image of God with a purpose.

La vida y obra del polígrafo granadino Lisān al-Dīn Ibn al-Ḫaṭīb (m. 776/1374) sigue siendo fuente de importantes estudios y traducciones habida cuenta de que su prolija producción literaria está repleta de valiosos testimonios históricos y personales que sitúan a su autor como un personaje destacado en la transmisión del conocimiento en el Mediterráneo islámico. En la difusión de su obra y prestigio jugó un papel fundamental la copia manuscrita de su obra al-Iḥāṭa fī aḫbār Ġarnāṭa que Ibn al-Ḫaṭīb envió (...) en vida (768/1366), a través de su hijo ʿAlī, a la ḫānqāh de Saʿīd al-suʿadāʾ de El Cairo, regida por el tremeceno Ibn Abī Ḥaǧala (m. 776/1375). El conocimiento de esta copia ha llegado hasta nosotros a través de otro tremeceno, al-Maqqarī (m. 1041/1632) y su monumental obra, Nafḥ al-ṭīb, en honor al sabio granadino. Gracias a ella sabemos, entre otras cosas, que esta copia fue profusamente consultada y comentada en sus márgenes. Dos autores destacan por encima de los demás: el hijo del autor Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī (m. s. IX/XV), y el magrebí Ibn Marzūq (m. 781/1379). A través del estudio y la traducción de las notas manuscritas de este manuscrito cairota, este estudio pretende poner de relieve el valor de los marginalia como fuente documental, así como arrojar un poco más de luz sobre estas dos figuras, junto con al-Maqqarī, como piezas importantes en la transmisión y pervivencia de la obra de Ibn al-Ḫaṭīb en el Oriente islámico hasta al menos el siglo XI/XVII. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo presentar un manuscrito conservado en la biblioteca de la Universidad de Bengasi (Libia) que contiene el Kitāb al-Ǧawhara fī nasab al-nabī ṣallā Allāh ʽalayhi wa-sallam wa-aṣḥābihi al-ʽašara por Abū ʽAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. ʽAbd Allāh b. Mūsà al-Anṣārī al-Barrī al-Tilimsānī (596/1200-681/1282). Aunque ha sido mencionado en algunas publicaciones, no llamó la atención de los especialistas de la historia cultural de al-Andalus. Debido a la situación actual de la institución de conservación, no ha (...) sido posible ver ni ofrecer reproducciones. Aun así, como se cedió una fotografía para un catálogo, el último folio resultó muy útil. Se hace constar claramente el origen de la obra, que fue copiada en Menorca por su propio autor en el año 645/1248. Además, se puede observar que fue ofrecido como regalo a Saʽīd b. Ḥakam al-Qurašī, el gobernador de la isla, que fundó una biblioteca cuya riqueza fue celebrada por los autores medievales. En el estado actual del conocimiento, se trata precisamente del quinto manuscrito identificado, encontrándose hoy los otros cuatro en la Real Biblioteca del Monasterio de San Lorenzo de El Escorial. La historia del manuscrito permanece oscura, aunque se puede dar por establecido que reapareció en Libia a mediados del siglo XIX, siendo entonces propiedad de Muḥammad b. ʽAlī al-Sanūsī, fundador de la poderosa ṭarīqa al-Sanūsiyya. (shrink)

Islam and society; religious life; Islam.

bakhsh-i 1. Majmūʻah-i 874, shāmil-i 6 risālah -- bakhsh-i 2. Majmūʻah-i 855, shāmil-i 3 risālah.

Talvez o paralelo mais próximo do Logos joanino no Islã seja encontrado na noção da "Realidade Muhammadana" (al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyya). O termo foi provavelmente usado pela primeira vez por Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240), mas a explicação detalhada mais antiga do que ela representa foi fornecida por Saʿīd ibn Aḥmad Farghānī (d. 1300), um excelente aluno do principal propagador de Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadr al-Dīn Qûnawī. Farghānī escreveu um comentário denso, em dois volumes, sobre a famosa qasida de 760 versos de Ibn al-Fāriḍ, (...) Naẓm al-sulûk. Profundamente enraizado na metafísica islâmica, na teologia e na psicologia espiritual, o comentário explica como o poeta está descrevendo o arquétipo eterno de Muhammad em Deus como o meio pelo qual Deus cria o universo e o lugar de retorno final de todas as coisas. (shrink)

La fuente principal antes de 1972 para conocer el pensamiento de Ibn Masarra era una breve descripción que Ibn Ḥazm hizo de algunos elementos fundamentales de su teología. En 1972, Muḥammad Kamāl Ibrāhīm Ŷaʿfar atribuyó a Ibn Masarra dos obras, Risālat al-Iʿtibār and Kitāb Jawāṣṣ al-ḥurūf, que se encuentran en un manuscrito de la Chester Beatty Library. El contenido de estas dos obras difiere de las descripciones que hacen las fuentes primarias del pensamiento de Ibn Masarra, pues en estas últimas (...) se le considera de manera mayoritaria un teólogo con creencias de corte qadarī, como al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd e istiṭāʿa. A la vista de las dos obras que Ŷaʿfar atribuyó a Ibn Masarra, la erudición posterior ha tachado la mayoría de fuentes primarias sobre Ibn Masarra de imprecisas, tendenciosas o mal informadas, de modo que las ha descartado. La fuente más esclarecedora sobre Ibn Masarra, al-Inbāʾ fī šarḥ ḥaqāʾiq al-ṣifāt wa-l-asmāʾ de Ibn al-Uqlīšī, parece haber pasado desapercibida hasta fechas recientes. Tomando como base la información que aporta Ibn al-Uqlīšī, este artículo sugiere la atribución a Ibn Masarra de al-Radd ʿalā l-Kindī, o Refutación de Sobre la Filosofía primera de al-Kindī, obra ya editada, si bien bajo la atribución a Ibn Ḥazm. Esta obra coincide con descripciones del pensamiento de Ibn Masarra en fuentes primarias, si bien excluyendo de las fuentes primarias las dos obras que Ŷaʿfar le atribuye. (shrink)